What if there was a person whose only and all-consuming desire was to have a bad life? According to the desire/satisfaction theory, if that person's desire was fulfilled, would that person have a good life, or a bad life?
Tuesday, February 24, 2015
Wednesday, February 18, 2015
Autonomy and Hedonism
Something that we discussed in
class about particular objections to the hedonistic theory to what constitutes
a good life is that you can obtain happiness and pleasure without having the
autonomy, or agency to make your own choices. Shafer-Landau makes the argument
that autonomy is intrinsically valuable, in that that it’s not merely the
happiness we obtain from having autonomy that gives us a good life. Its
autonomy in it’s own right that gives value and is essential to a good life. Is it possible to break down some
of Shafer-Landau’s examples that support this conclusion that he puts forth? Is
it possible to discern whether or not autonomy is intrinsically valuable? Could
it be that it’s the perception of the lack of autonomy (rather than the
autonomy itself, or intrinsically) is what causes this man pain or lack of
unhappiness?
SL brings up the scenarios in The Brave New World, where the citizens
lose their autonomy to experience upsetting or painful things in their life by
taking the drug, soma, and other avoidance mechanisms put forth by the
governmental agencies. SL argues that the loss of autonomy is intrinsically
valuable, and despite experiencing only pleasure in this world, it is still not
enough for a good life. However, what if this new world seems worse off not
because of the lack of autonomy but rather the lack of diversity or expression
we see in our world today? In other examples that SL provides, he discusses how
the independence of the people is crushed, which would lead to a less happy
life, which is something we would perceive as a life that is not as good. But
what if it is not the lack of autonomy that is abhorrent but rather the morality
of taking away someone’s autonomy? It seems apparent that it is morally wrong
to take away someone’s autonomy but what if someone willingly gives it up? There
is no reason to say that this person is will be less happy without autonomy,
but if someone who appreciates and values their autonomy is forced to give it
up it is understandable that they would have less happiness in their life.
Consider the case where an average
person seems to be living “the good life,” which is full of whatever the person
would consider qualities of the good life. However, the person feels like he
has no control over what is happening in his life; everything happens is
destiny (even if these are good things). In reality, the person does have the
autonomy to make the decisions in his life; he just doesn’t perceive that he
does. This perceived lack of control over his life is what makes this person
unhappy. Could it be argued that the perception of autonomy is what would make
the person happy? Not the autonomy itself? Or, to take it one step further,
does this scenario suggest that some pain or displeasure is essential quality
to the good life (as some have argued in class) even if it may be due to one’s
own choices?
Monday, February 9, 2015
Survival Lottery: Do Numbers (Utilitarian value) Really Justify Violating People's Right to Live?
With the Survival Lottery, making a distinction between morality and utility may be important. Killing person A to save persons Y and Z has more utilitarian value than letting Y and Z die; one more person lives than would have otherwise. In terms of numbers alone, the survival lottery has utilitarian value.
However, utilitarian value is not the same as moral rights. Person A has a moral right to live. In order to determine whether the Survival Lottery is morally acceptable, we have to ascertain whether utilitarian value -- in this case, a higher number of living persons -- actually justifies the violation of person A's moral right to live.
Consider self-defense killing. Killing a person in self-defense is justifiable because the assailant is guilty of trying to violate the victim's right to live. Before anything related to an attempted killing, both persons (the not-yet assailant and the future victim) have a moral right to live. However, by trying to rob the victim of his life, the assailant's moral right to live is justifiably suspended until the victim's life is secured.
Persons Y and Z (organ patients) are in an unfair and tragic situation, true. They don't have malevolent intent to kill person A; they simply want viable organs from some source. Yet, the Survival Lottery is still just premeditated murder; it involves a pre-established plan to kill people in order to obtain organs. Despite the fact that their situation is unfair, it does not justify the killing of person A, because person A is innocent in this affair. Consider the following analogy.
A group of sociopathic criminals take control of a building and randomly take two people hostage at gunpoint. The hostages did nothing to deserve being captured; they were simply unlucky. Despite their efforts, the security guards are unable to rescue the hostages. To satisfy a dark need for control, the terrorists deliver an ultimatum: they will release the hostages unharmed only if either the security guards (or bystanders) will kill one person at random. Desperate to live, the hostages ask for someone to save them by killing some random person. The hostages don't have a malevolent intent to kill someone; they just want to be released. Does this situation give anyone there the moral right to kill someone?
In this analogy:
hostages = patients
criminals = organ diseases
security guards = doctors
one person at random = person A's group.
If acquiescing to the criminals' demand in order to save the hostages is morally wrong in this analogy, then acquiescing to the dire circumstances of organ disease by killing person A for organs should also be morally wrong.
Some Thoughts on the Survival Lottery
I want to explore a situation assuming we have "perfectly" instituted the Survival Lottery. In particular, the decision to use third parties for organ harvesting and not those who are already in need of organs. I am not going to address the morality of any other action associated with the Lottery.
We have persons A, X, Y, and Z.
Persons X, Y, and Z are all in need of an organ transplant. Without one, they will die.
Person A does not need an organ transplant to live.
All persons have organs that are compatible with each other.
With each person, I will associate two numbers.
The first is their Value, or how much their life is worth. Because all people have the same Value, we can give all people the same number. Every person's Value will be equal. We can say that each person has a Value equal to 1.
The second is that person's Cost. Cost is measured as the Value that was sacrificed in order to save that person's life. Alternatively, it is the measure of how many people had to die in order for that person to live. For example, If three people sacrificed themselves so that another may live, then the survivor's Cost would be equal to 3. The Cost does not have to be a whole number. If one person dies so that two people may live, then both of the survivors would have Costs equal to 0.5.
When there are multiple people, we can add these numbers together. If there are five people in a room, then we can say together, they have 5 Value. If two of those people had separate cases where a person sacrificed their lives for their sake, and everyone else did not, then the total Cost of those five people would be 2.
Intuitively, it appears that it would be preferable if Cost were a smaller number than Value.
We have seen that Harris rejects the objection to 3rd party involvement. He claims that it would be unfair to deliberately select "life-givers" among those who are in need of organs. We would be biased against the "unlucky". I think he is wrong, and that using dying people's organs would save more lives, (provided that the health of the harvestee would have no impact on the transplant).
What I want to show is that choosing to use the organs of those who are dying of organ failure, would be better, save more lives, than using an otherwise healthy person's.
Case 1.
A is picked by the lottery to be killed in order to save the lives of Y and Z. X is ignored in this case and his fate will be determined by other circumstances.
Person A - Dead
Person Y - 1 Value, 0.5 Cost.
Person Z - 1 Value, 0.5 Cost
Total - 2 Value, 1 Cost
In this case, at the cost of 1 human life we saved 2 lives.
Case 2.
X is deliberately chosen to be killed to save the lives of Y and Z. A is left alone. The outcome of this case will be:
Person A - 1 Value, 0 Cost
Person X - Dead
Person Y - 1 Value, 0.5 Cost
Person Z - 1 Value, 0.5 Cost
Total - 3 Value, 1 Cost
In this case, we achieved a higher Value, for the same Cost. We were more efficient when it came to saving lives.
You may argue that Person A is alive as a direct result of Person X being chosen instead. Even if that were the case, which it could be, the Value of Person X's life would then be split three ways. Persons A, Y and Z would all have Costs of 1/3 and the total Cost would not change.
It could be said that comparing these two cases would be improper without considering X's numbers in case 1. So let's do that. If X dies, then that would clearly make case 1 worse than case 2. You would rather have 3 people live than only 2. If X is to survive however, then both cases would have equal value: 3. However, the total Costs would be different. X can only survive if another person dies to give up his organs (in this scenario). If X survives, then it would necessarily mean that X has incurred some Cost greater than 0. Thus the total Cost in case 1 would be higher than in case 2. It is impossible for case 1 to have a higher Value/Cost ratio than case 2.
What does it matter that case 2 achieves a higher Value/Cost ratio than case 1?
It matters because the sacrifice of a single life can save more lives when the value/cost ratio is higher than when it is lower. If it is more morally right to chose the option that saves more lives, then it would be morally correct to chose the option with a higher Value/Cost ratio.
Therefore, when determining which person to use for harvesting organs, it would be morally right to select ones who are already in need of an organ.
What does everyone else think? Whose organs should we harvest?
We have persons A, X, Y, and Z.
Persons X, Y, and Z are all in need of an organ transplant. Without one, they will die.
Person A does not need an organ transplant to live.
All persons have organs that are compatible with each other.
With each person, I will associate two numbers.
The first is their Value, or how much their life is worth. Because all people have the same Value, we can give all people the same number. Every person's Value will be equal. We can say that each person has a Value equal to 1.
The second is that person's Cost. Cost is measured as the Value that was sacrificed in order to save that person's life. Alternatively, it is the measure of how many people had to die in order for that person to live. For example, If three people sacrificed themselves so that another may live, then the survivor's Cost would be equal to 3. The Cost does not have to be a whole number. If one person dies so that two people may live, then both of the survivors would have Costs equal to 0.5.
When there are multiple people, we can add these numbers together. If there are five people in a room, then we can say together, they have 5 Value. If two of those people had separate cases where a person sacrificed their lives for their sake, and everyone else did not, then the total Cost of those five people would be 2.
Intuitively, it appears that it would be preferable if Cost were a smaller number than Value.
We have seen that Harris rejects the objection to 3rd party involvement. He claims that it would be unfair to deliberately select "life-givers" among those who are in need of organs. We would be biased against the "unlucky". I think he is wrong, and that using dying people's organs would save more lives, (provided that the health of the harvestee would have no impact on the transplant).
What I want to show is that choosing to use the organs of those who are dying of organ failure, would be better, save more lives, than using an otherwise healthy person's.
Case 1.
A is picked by the lottery to be killed in order to save the lives of Y and Z. X is ignored in this case and his fate will be determined by other circumstances.
Person A - Dead
Person Y - 1 Value, 0.5 Cost.
Person Z - 1 Value, 0.5 Cost
Total - 2 Value, 1 Cost
In this case, at the cost of 1 human life we saved 2 lives.
Case 2.
X is deliberately chosen to be killed to save the lives of Y and Z. A is left alone. The outcome of this case will be:
Person A - 1 Value, 0 Cost
Person X - Dead
Person Y - 1 Value, 0.5 Cost
Person Z - 1 Value, 0.5 Cost
Total - 3 Value, 1 Cost
In this case, we achieved a higher Value, for the same Cost. We were more efficient when it came to saving lives.
You may argue that Person A is alive as a direct result of Person X being chosen instead. Even if that were the case, which it could be, the Value of Person X's life would then be split three ways. Persons A, Y and Z would all have Costs of 1/3 and the total Cost would not change.
It could be said that comparing these two cases would be improper without considering X's numbers in case 1. So let's do that. If X dies, then that would clearly make case 1 worse than case 2. You would rather have 3 people live than only 2. If X is to survive however, then both cases would have equal value: 3. However, the total Costs would be different. X can only survive if another person dies to give up his organs (in this scenario). If X survives, then it would necessarily mean that X has incurred some Cost greater than 0. Thus the total Cost in case 1 would be higher than in case 2. It is impossible for case 1 to have a higher Value/Cost ratio than case 2.
What does it matter that case 2 achieves a higher Value/Cost ratio than case 1?
It matters because the sacrifice of a single life can save more lives when the value/cost ratio is higher than when it is lower. If it is more morally right to chose the option that saves more lives, then it would be morally correct to chose the option with a higher Value/Cost ratio.
Therefore, when determining which person to use for harvesting organs, it would be morally right to select ones who are already in need of an organ.
What does everyone else think? Whose organs should we harvest?
Friday, February 6, 2015
Singer and Ethical Intuitions
I wanted to post something up here to think about regarding Singer's use of intuitions in his `Solution to World Poverty'. He relies on the intuition that we would usually think it would be wrong for Bob not to direct a train from a child to his car, or that we would harshly judge someone who would not risk some loss of clothing articles to save a drowning child. Moreover, these intuitions seem to be very universal.
He then argues that these intuitive obligations translate to an obligation to help children in need in far away places. What I wanted to think about was that THAT intuition does not seem widespread at all. That is, people usually don't go around judging people for buying movie tickets instead of donating the money. Does that fact in itself undermine his argument at all, or is that just irrelevant?
More to the point: In the case of the drowning child nearby the intuition that we ought to help is supposed to pick out something morally significant that can do work in a moral argument. But the intuition 'Nothing wrong going on here' in the case of people buying movie tickets is presumably supposed to not do any moral work or serve as a premise for a moral argument. But what reasons do we have to judge one intuition as "morally insightful" and the other as maybe misguided or unreflective?
Just something I thought I'd raise, I wonder what people think about it.
He then argues that these intuitive obligations translate to an obligation to help children in need in far away places. What I wanted to think about was that THAT intuition does not seem widespread at all. That is, people usually don't go around judging people for buying movie tickets instead of donating the money. Does that fact in itself undermine his argument at all, or is that just irrelevant?
More to the point: In the case of the drowning child nearby the intuition that we ought to help is supposed to pick out something morally significant that can do work in a moral argument. But the intuition 'Nothing wrong going on here' in the case of people buying movie tickets is presumably supposed to not do any moral work or serve as a premise for a moral argument. But what reasons do we have to judge one intuition as "morally insightful" and the other as maybe misguided or unreflective?
Just something I thought I'd raise, I wonder what people think about it.
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